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Towards an Internet Bill of Rights GIOVANNA DE MINICO I. SOME QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED This work seeks to spark some questions about what rules might be set up for the Internet and what the goals of these rules should be.
The first question examined is whether a binding regulation of the Internet is required. This debate is mainly propelled by the American doctrine, 1 a doctrine divided between the champions of unchecked selfregulation-drawn by the network providers themselves 2 -and those in favour of an absorbing intervention by an authority. 3 The second question explored is whether a binding regulation would require a formal modification of national Constitutions eschewing any reference to the Internet. This article intends to detail and explore a third alternative: the proposal of a specific and supranational "Bill of rights" for the Internet.
This proposal prompts further questions: which legislative body should write this Bill? What should the relationship be between binding and film companies, which led to a legislation in 2009 that primarily focused on creating stringent copyright protection. 8 In Italy, a substantial lack of legislative attention on Internet-related issues has been superseded by a very controversial initiative by the competent national Authority. 9 Finally, the European Court of Justice has extensively used the European Union Regulation on E-Commerce addressing the issue of Internet Service Provider accountability. 10 These instances clearly prove the existence of an uneven framework born out of occasional pressures and initiatives. This further underlines the necessity of general regulations that extend beyond both national boundaries and the sectional interests prevailing in any given moment. A comprehensive view of the possible answers will support the assertion that all technical issues concerning the Internet cannot be left to the invisible hand of a market-oriented technological development, rather, it should be goal-oriented towards achieving a common good. Should this happen, the Internet would finally be a unique and effective opportunity for everyone to pursue personal growth and participation in the virtual political process. Such an outcome, however, can only be ensured through clear choices made by policymakers and netizens. To outline which choices should be adopted, and how they should be adopted, is the main goal of this article. The first step of the inquiry is to consider whether a heteronomous system of regulation, or self-regulation, should be pursued for the Internet, keeping in mind that self-regulation is an inherently multifaceted notion.
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A direct connection exists between the legal value of selfregulation and its conformity with the relevant legal systems. 12 Acts of self-regulation, if public powers adequately defined their content and if authority is vested onto its authors, deserve a place in the conversation next to binding sources. This is contrary to the case of unfettered selfregulations.
There may be the case of a State leaving all initiative to private bodies, getting involved only when self-regulation is missing. This form of self-regulation takes place within the limits of the freedom of negotiation, 13 as long as no problem arises, the State does not directly intervene. Nevertheless, the fact that the state may act turns that absence into a potential presence on the assumption that "if nothing is done State action will follow." 14 This self-regulation model may be defined as "independent" from the law since the law is entirely lacking, even as a minimal framework for the inter partes negotiation. 15 This is a historically regressive model. 16 Private stakeholders, when left by themselves, have shown time and time again that they pursue only egotistical interests. 17 11. LINDA SENDEN, SOFT LAW IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 118-20 (2004 Therefore, the achievement of the common good depends on whenever it, by chance, happens to correspond with private interests. In a different model, the State entrusts meaningful social tasks to a private body while continuing to regulate the overall legal structure and decision-making process.
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Without maintaining ultimate authority, there would be no guarantees that the task entrusted to the private body would be successfully fulfilled. In such a case, self-regulation becomes an instrument in the hands of public entities where the involved private body is nothing more than an expression of indirect administration.
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Despite that, an exchange is nevertheless realized between the private stakeholders and the State; the private stakeholders relinquish in whole, or in part, their regulating and managing autonomy while the State vests in the private stakeholders the total, or partial, enforcing power typically granted by the law.
The question then becomes, what model of regulation would be better suited for the internet: a self-regulating one independent from the law or a self-regulation model shaped by binding law that functions as part of the legal system? An answer cannot be wholly in favour of self regulation or binding law, but should be found in an intermediate position. US scholars, 20 mainly Lessig, 21 have looked for a solution to the regulation issue in four constraints: "the law, social norms, the market and architecture". A good example of how these constraints should mix is shown by the evo-RE-REGULATION?: REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 239 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990), ("[Private bodies] "may claim that their objectives are in line with the public interest, but whether or not this is so will depend on the frameworks in which they operate.").
18. BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 14, at 125-126. 19 . Sometimes there might be a definitional rather than substantial difference. For instance, the Italian legal tradition typically refers to a concept of "indirect administration" which comes close to the concourse among the binding sources and self-regulation set forth by Anthony Ogus in his article, Rethinking Self-Regulation. The author clearly explains the role of the State: to promote the competition between the S.R.A. and "lay down a minimum quality standards which the S.R.A. regimes must presumptively satisfy" Rethinking Self-Regulation, supra note 12, at 106. 22 Criminal sanctions alone proved to be largely ineffective, because the illegal download from Internet was not considered socially reprehensible. 23 A turnabout occurred with policies of substantial price reductions for legal purchases, also due to the introduction of creative commons licensing, 24 to the construction of which scholars gave an essential support. 25 Creative Commons offers copyright holders a simple way to mark their creative works with the freedoms they intend for it to carry: "[t]hat mark is a license which reserves to the author some rights, while dedicating to the public rights that otherwise would have been held privately. As these licenses are nonexclusive and public, they too effectively build a commons of creative resources that anyone can build upon." 26 The final outcome was that Internet users deemed that paying a reasonably low price for legal purchases was more convenient than facing the possibility of heavy criminal sanctions.
Creative Commons contributed greatly in preventing criminal behavior since they helped educate the community of web surfers to be lawful by offering them a chance to have their way at a low cost.
In modern societies pluralism is a basic principle, not by chance a cornerstone of the regulatory issue in the Internet. This principle is construed here in the terms of different sources of law, both public and private, concurring in the regulation. But pluralism must be measured against the necessity of a legal system, 27 i.e. a coherent and comprehensive set of rules. The compatibility is generally assured in European Civil Law countries through the notion that the sources of law are placed in a hierarchical order 28 29 The latter may integrate the political decision-making initiated by the former, but is not allowed to totally take its place and initiate that decision-making by itself.
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A question arises here about which role should be reserved to the State.
It should not be called to act as a regulator in detail of individual behaviour, but rather as an overall system architect, intervening before and after self-regulation. Ex ante, the State will define the general rules, the goals to be pursued, the values to be fulfilled. Ex post, it will be in the State's responsibility to correct any deviation of private regulations from the rules it has preliminarily set.
More specifically, the relative weight of heteronomy upon selfregulation will grow together with the capacity of the negotiated law to seek erga-omnes effects extending its application to a wider community than the one which it directly represents, 31 In such a case it will fall upon the State to look into the structure and the organization of the private subjects in order that an adequate representativeness, transparency, and democratic decision-making processes may be insured. 32 The necessity for the State to intervene is given by the substantial equivalence between private regulation and a properly legal source of law.
Conclusively, in a correct order, law comes first, self-regulation follows. If the order is inverted, the inherently secondary nature of selfregulation with respect to the law will be merely fictitious. 33 Selfregulation will absorb a substantial law-making role and will be applied as a fully legal source of law. Damages to the constitutional architecture will be inevitable.
Nevertheless, it may happen that the correct relationship between content provider the quality and speed of the connection. In such a case, the negotiation is incompatible with the consumer's right to a free choice, and therefore, a right to the net in a strict sense does not exist anymore.
On the question of what net neutrality should be, the FCC has repeatedly spoken on, and has recently launched, a rulemaking procedure on how best an open Internet can be protected and promoted. 40 The opening question was: " [w] hat is the right public policy to ensure that the Internet remains open?" Two options were set forth. The first one was to maintain the existing regulatory approach. Under the second one, the cable and phone companies would be required to provide a basic and equal level of unfettered Internet service to their broadband subscribers, beyond which they would be allowed to charge different fees for a faster delivery to consumers. It was objected that the second option allowing the distinction between basic and premium offerings would have divided the Internet into the "haves" and the "have-nots".
The first solution has finally prevailed 41 : a really open Internet governed by public rules resistant to the economic interests of broadband providers. However, this querelle should be considered still open.
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The examples made so far show a self-regulation secondary to binding law. But they also show a pluralistic environment of which selfregulation is a necessary element. Teubner an effective monopoly of lawmaking. It therefore acknowledges its own limitations, allowing other subjects 44 the power to write rules for individual and collective behaviors which are subsequently taken up as part of the legal system. This is the theory of reflexive law, which correctly describes the experience of modern legal systems, although attention must be paid to avoiding some possible excesses. 45 Reflexive law finds an appropriate structural solution in a pluralistic architecture in which a higher-level legal system -the State -encompasses one or more autonomous legal subsystems, which exist and operate within the limits established by the former. 46 In this perspective the subsystems are necessarily secondary to the higher-level legal system, and the role of private subjects may be differently defined as far as scope, procedures, effects are concerned. A French author has depicted the private contribution as limited to the "mise en oeuvre des politiques publiques" (the implementation of public policies). 47 In any case, the State maintains a full authority 48 and a final word on the system as a whole, although relinquishing the role of exclusive lawmaker,
The circle is now complete: political decision-makers and public powers should keep their leadership in the self-regulating processes, intervening with ex ante determination of its goals, and ex-post control and correction.
A measure of heteronomous regulation is necessary. But a question is open: which should the scope and content of this regulation be?
As far as the Internet is concerned, the starting point is found in the 44. See A Hard Look, supra note 15, at 198 ("Hence, private associations must promote policies adjusting self-regulation from the beginning to social purposes . . . and the State claims 'the chance of political decision' though respecting 'the organised power to act of social bodies.").
45. Courts' decisions -both the European Court of Human Rights 49 and the U.S. Supreme Court 50 -affirming that rules should be specifically suited to their object. Therefore, offline media regulations cannot as such be made applicable online. 51 Should this happen, the Internet would lose its uniqueness. Furthermore, an unfettered Internet is essential to the circulation of ideas which is a basic instrument of economic and social growth. 52 As a consequence, regulations should be kept at a minimum level.
Regulation of the Internet is thus faced with the supreme value of the marketplace of ideas 53 resembling a transposition of the economic theory of laissez-faire on the ground of an exchange of immaterial goods. Freedom of speech imposes itself as the unique and real cornerstone of democracy. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that "governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it."
54 As the Supreme Court stated in the ACLU the assumption that in a democratic society censorship may prove beneficial is "theoretical but unproven." 55 For the first time in the history of mankind, billions of people can easily communicate and share information through the Internet, and there can be no overwhelming public or private interest justifying the substantial curtailment of the Internet's effectiveness. Therefore, a basic principle can be drawn stating that a regulation of the Internet, even when required should be kept as light and unobtrusive as possible. With a general framework for the internet drawn up, one question remains: is it then necessary to update those national Constitutions that do not mention the Internet at all?
As a starting point, three Constitutions-namely the Italian, French and American ones-will be discussed, as they already entail norms protecting traditional media -radio, television, and newspapers -yet at the same time lack specific rules for online media such as Internet blogs and social network websites. real focus of Internet regulation is found-as it will be explained more extensively later-in the identification of a supranational rule-maker. A national Constitution, applicable within the territory of a single State, might be an obstacle in the broader perspective of a discipline that encompasses a number of States with different legislative histories, experiences, and economic and social interests. From this point of view, a specific and detailed constitutional provision might not be the right answer.
An alternative is found in adopting a broad interpretation of the existing constitutional provision, in order that they may be applied to the new virtual reality.
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This approach would be made easier by the inherent flexibility of many Constitutional provisions.
60 This is the case of art. 15 and 21 of the Italian Constitution, which grant protection to named media, but also refer respectively to "every other form of communication" (Art. 15) and "any other means of communication" (Art. 21).
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A similar example is given by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 62 which has been construed in the sense that the Internet is fully within the constitutional safeguards of the freedom of speech. 63 No reform of the Amendment has been deemed necessary.
The extension of the same constitutional protection to rights and liberties offline and online does not imply an automatic transfer of the offline discipline, as a whole, in the world of virtual reality. As it has been argued previously, this would not be effective and would only undermine the uniqueness of the Internet. The extension considered here is limited to the basic constitutional guarantees of rights and liberties, while a different sub-constitutional regulation may remain to be provid- A. From the "law clause" to the "rule of law" of the international system I shall start by examining the basic safeguards provided by the Italian Constitution for fundamental rights and liberties offline.
In the Italian Constitution a basic guarantee of rights and liberties is found in the law clause ("riserva di legge"), 64 by which a primary legislative rule must be adopted first, 65 while a secondary rule may be adopted subsequently and only within limits necessarily defined by the former. 66 In matters concerning copyright and the Internet, Legislative Decree n. 44/2010 67 does not comply with this principle, vesting upon the Authority for the Guarantee of Communication, 68 a general responsibility, without defining in detail the Authority's powers. In the absence of a specific legislative foundation, the Authority itself (Deliberation N. 680/13/CONS) 69 has assumed to have the power of closing websites or requiring that some contents be cancelled, following a summary assessment of their illicit nature .The Authority's decision is a secondary source, and therefore in virtue of the "law clause" is not allowed to introduce an original innovation in the legal system without an adequate foundation in a primary source. 70 Consequently, the compli- 65. A primary source is construed by the Italian doctrine as a regulatory will expressed by a constitutional power specifically vested with political functions. This source has the basic task to define and initiate the policy project that will be developed by the secondary sources (see for all the clear pages written by V. CRISAFULLI, Lezioni di diritto costituzionale (Lessons of constitutional law), 2 nd vol., (Padova: Cedam, 1993), 140-159. 66. Because of this secondary nature, some scholars have stated that in force of the legality principle, a previous provision of law conferring a blank power to the secondary source is not sufficient. The law must intervene indicating the aim, the scope, and the guidelines with which the secondary power is required to comply. So G.U. 71 by which a decision-making power upon websites is given to an independent authority. 72 In a comparative context, a safeguard for the protection of human rights substantially equivalent but not identical to the Italian Constitution's "law clause" 73 may be found in the "rule of law". 74 This means that the discipline of fundamental rights must be prescribed by a law that is "adequately accessible"
75 and "formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct." 76 A close scrutiny reveals a notable difference between the international principle and the Italian clause. In the perspective of the "rule of law", the secondary sources are usually allowed a much wider access to regulation.
77 Not on- 72. In the case under examination, the conflict arises between the copyright -the author's right to his intellectual property-and everyone's right to be informed. Clearly unequal values are compared: one financial, and the other, a fundamental right. The latter, which would not be comparable with a value of a different nature in principle, is de facto widely sacrificed by both the French and Italian laws in favor of the right to an economic exploitation of intellectual work. Another flaw can be found considering that in this case, the measure of coexistence between conflicting values is a basic political issue. Therefore, it cannot be wholly entrusted to an authority, Court or I.R.A., and should be vested primarily upon a representative and politically responsible legislator.
73 ly are the Assembly's legislative acts allowed to intervene, but the decisions from the public authority (containing general and abstract provisions) are permitted to as well. 78 The rule of law can therefore be summarized as upholding fundamental rights against the public powers' arbitrary decisions 79 in spite of its legal form, be it an act issued by the Parliament or by the Government. 80 This principle strengthens the protection of rights, namely in preventing the violation of liberties that may arise from a Parliamentary act, which does not comply with the standards of generality and abstractness. 81 Conversely, the same principle weakens this protection by allowing a secondary source to set out the discipline without any previous legislative intervention.
B. From the "jurisdictional clause" to the due process
Fundamental rights and liberties online can find within the Italian Constitution a second basic safeguard in the jurisdictional clause ("riserva di giurisdizione", as explained elsewhere). This "riserva", applying the principle of separation of powers, 82 entrust the power of judicial review solely upon the judiciary.
The Italian Constitution provides a strong protection for the independence of the judiciary. No political or administrative body is allowed to interfere with judicial functions, 83 82. For the purpose of this essay, a general definition of the principle of separation of powers will be adequate: a more or less rigid division of power between the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary aimed at the essential checks and balances required by democracy. For a supranational analysis beyond specific States, see CHRISTOPH MOELLERS, THE THREE BRANCHES: A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 150 (2013).
83. On the guaranteed independence of the judiciary power see, among the others: R. Guastini, 'Commento all'art. 101', at G. Branca-A. Pizzorusso (eds), Commentario della Costituzione. La magistratura, vol. Ist, (Bologna-Roma, 1994) 172; F. Bartole, Autonomia e indipendenza sively applying the law. This independence is the basic reason why only a judge is allowed to limit fundamental rights and liberties in compliance with the law. One can see here that the jurisdictional clause and the law clause work in synergy.
For this reason, a strong dissent should be expressed against 84 the Italian Legislative Decree n. 44/2010.
The constitutionality of the Decree can be challenged on several grounds, one of which is found in the lack of compliance with the jurisdictional clause. The power to "clean" the websites, ordering that a specific content be cancelled, is entrusted to an independent regulatory authority. Since such an order inevitably affects the freedom of speech, a constitutionally sound solution would require a court proceeding and a judicial decision. The Decree's provision may recall the French law Hadopi 1, before the decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel and the subsequent modifications.
On an international level, the jurisdictional clause is present. In the European Court of Human Rights' decisions, for instance, it is in the weaker form of due process. 85 In fact the European Convention on Human Rights (especially, Articles. 5-6) does not force EU Member States to confer power, as detailed above, only to a judge.
86 Different authori- Pending the publication of this essay, the Decree was challenged on the grounds illustrated above before the Constitutional Court, see: Tar Lazio, sez.I n. 10016 /2014 and n.10020/2014, at http://www.neldiritto.it/appgiurisprudenza.asp?id=10792#.VWYGbc_tmko 85. Being this topic only partially connected to our study it is enough here to refer to the same scholars quoted at note n. 87.
86. The concept of "judge" or "tribunal" is interpreted by the E.C.H.R. in an autonomous manner. In fact, in the Ringeisen case (ECHR, 16 July 1971, Ringeisen -Austria (Series A-16), parag. 94-95) the Court had to decide whether article six was applicable in an Austrian dispute concerning the purchase of property. The Court held that the administrative character of the Authority was of little consequence, so it concluded that the body was a "tribunal." In doctrine for all: F. Matscher, 'La notion de 'tribunal' au sens de la Convention européenne des droit de l'homme', in R. Koering-Jouklin, Les nouveaux développements du procès équitable au sens de la Convention européenne des droit de l'homme (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996), 33. [Vol. 37:1 ties may be entrusted with the implementation of legal rules, provided that their decisions are based upon a fair hearing and a reasonable motivation. 87 What matters here is that the act concretely imposing limits will be adopted in an adversarial proceeding, allowing those who must bear those limits to have prompt knowledge of them in order to make their opposing arguments heard. And, should the relevant Authority, after the resolution of the conflicting issues, be convinced of the validity and truth of those limits, it will have to make the iter of its decision understandable to all.
88 Therefore, the interference with the peaceful enjoyment of one's assets is accompanied by procedural guarantees ensuring a reasonable opportunity to make one's case before the competent authorities.
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This approach is considered a somewhat weaker one, as independence, impartiality, and neutrality -essential requisites for a fair assessment of the parties' dispute -are, in principle, more fully ensured by judges, although in different ways in different States.
After examining the essential framework of the constitutional protection of rights and liberties in the Italian legal system, as well as in a comparative perspective, it is necessary to state a point: the underlying assumptions may be deemed valid for any legal system. As Fuller points out, laws must comply with some basic requirements, ensuring at least their legitimacy and efficiency. 90 In this perspective, the existence of a territorial location may not be relevant. It can therefore be argued that the same framework applies to rights and liberties wherever they are exercised. Their nature or scope does not change when they move to the virtual world of the Internet, nor do they become any less fundamental. 87 . The ECHR has developed its own substantive requirements for a "tribunal." In particular, the body must have the power of decision; operate on the basis of rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner; determine matters within its competence; motivate its decisions and be independent and impartial. 88. This is the case of the Independent Administrative Authorities. As I noted in a previous essay, although they do not belong to the judiciary power, they must motivate their decisions in order to allow a judicial review be conducted over them. The basic function of constitutional safeguards, aimed at preventing any breach of those rights, is equally confirmed. For example, freedom of speech in an online blog should be protected against ex ante controls as it is the case with the written speech of a book. In both cases the speech is addressed to an indefinite number of people and a similar damage would ensue from curtailing a speaker's freedom. Therefore, no rational foundation may be indicated for a different definition or implementation of the constitutional framework.
IV. FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INTERNET TO AN INTERNET BILL OF RIGHTS
I started my discourse by denying the need for a formal modification of the Constitutions in order to encompass the Internet. Significant similarities can be found in a compared reading of the North American and the European systems. It may now be useful to take a further step in stating the necessity of an "Internet Bill of Rights".
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Regulations of the Internet have so far been discussed through underlining some common elements following a comparative perspective. It is this author's argument that a global and rapidly changing reality shows a highly fragmented picture. More specifically, the mosaic of multiple State net regulations, filtered through widely different social, economic, and political conditions in different territories, cannot effectively keep such a fast pace. Even more, the a-territorial nature of the Internet radically clashes per se with the limitations imposed by State boundaries. 92 This suggests the increasing necessity of a set of basic rules that can be both generally accepted and acknowledged as a primary, binding source of law for all those public or private subjects interacting with the Internet.
There are a number of fundamental rights and liberties that already enjoy a constitutional protection in different legal systems, even in the absence of specific provisions concerning the Internet. 93 But undoubtedly the Internet goes nowadays well beyond freedom of speech and communication, crucial as they may be in a democratic society. The In- 93. This issue has already been dealt with at the beginning of this essay, where the only two Constitutions, containing explicit provisions for the Internet have been mentioned see supra note 56. [Vol. 37:1 ternet appears more and more as the most powerful tool ever forged for social inclusion and economic growth, which is exactly why the digital divide should be considered a decisive factor of inequality among countries and individuals. Such a scenario suggests that a conclusive and satisfactory answer cannot be found in the interpretation-broad as it may be-of some constitutional provisions written at a time when there was no awareness of this new reality.
This global situation does indeed urge a proper "Internet Bill of Rights". In doing so, another question is then raised: who is the constituent power of the Internet? In other words: which Authority shall be legitimated 94 to write the fundamental Charter of the Internet? It is clear from what I said before that the hypothesis of one or more national States assuming such a role must be rejected. 95 The aterritorial nature of the Internet would be incompatible with an Authority entrusted with powers constrained within State boundaries. 96 The features of the Internet require, as stated above, that only a supranational legislator should be called upon to write its Constitution. Even so, one question remains open: should such a legislator be an international body through an authoritative hard-law regulation, or should it rather be the community of Internet 'surfers' through self-regulation? The former have frequently proven to be unable to build the consensus necessary to condense and shape the common good in a supranational synthesis. 97 Furthermore, they fall easily under the influence of strong national States, the interests of which only occasionally coincide with a broader common good. 98 In brief, international organizations tend to reproduce, albeit on a smaller scale, the basic flaw of world politics, a system of interactions between autonomous nation-States at best. In this framework, Therefore, the idea of an Internet Bill of Right written by its own people, entrusting regulation to an endogenous process of selforganization, might gain some ground. Effective examples can be offered by institutions such as ICANN, 99 courts of arbitration, or international standardization organizations such as the World Wide Web Consortium. This is a better solution as to the need of effective supranationality. New problems, however, arise, since it refers to a plurality of subjects not yet transformed into a body formally vested with authoritative powers.
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Considering the current situation, the risk of a "corporate constitutionalism" cannot be overlooked. 101 As Teubner stated, such a risk is inherent whenever well-structured and significantly funded private bodies enter the field. 102 The Internet may very well be the "most prominent case of constitutional law created through multinational corporations private ordering." 103 And even if all stereotypes should be refused, corporate constitutionalism will undoubtedly be accompanied by "the glimmering of the constitution of multi-national enterprises as an autonomous community of entities that have begun to regulate themselves through the construction of systems of governance independent of the states." 104 The risk underlined by Teubner should not be underestimated. A private interest government, to use an expression familiar to some scholars, 105 is entrusted with social tasks if it enacts regulations affecting not only their associates, but also third parties. This is not the case of a regulatory power bestowed on the decision makers through a contractu-al obligation where members involved accept the rules. Instead, were a private interest government to enact and enforce those rules applicable to everyone working in the field beyond the relevant social group of stipulating members, a basic issue of democracy arises. In such cases, the consensus within the social group will not give the regulator an adequate and proper basis to adopt acts affecting third parties per se. The issues of representativeness and democratic governance are paramount, as they ultimately define the interaction among the conflicting interests underlying the rules to be drawn. 106 Therefore, I propose a median hypothesis. First, the legislative power should be vested in a public supranational authoritative body, based on legal and binding provisions, which also defines the nature and scope of its powers. Second, the decision-making process of such a body should encompass a strong representation of private interests concerning the Internet such as entrepreneurs, web surfers, and consumers. The basic model could be drawn to resemble the notice and comment procedure, well-known to the American experience in the field of regulations. 107 Opposing stakeholders should discuss basic issues before a public authority, who is able to make the final decision after the different views have been listened to and fully taken into account. The problems of standing and those concerning the choice of interests to be admitted to such a procedure have been extensively explored by the American doctrine, which could be a reference on this point.
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The model proposed here would answer the questions on rule maker legitimacy as it would be based on formally legal provisions. It would also offer at least a partial answer to the doubts aroused by the possibility that the supranational body be captured by the interests of the stronger national States participating in its decisions. Such a risk is reduced by the fact that the private competing interests taking part in the decision may formally have a territorial or national identity, but this will not decisively affect their interests or policies. Although the idea of a supranational constitutional legislator for the Internet may appear unrealistic in the current situation, the need for a set of commonly accepted basic rules is clear and immediately present. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a number of States can reach an agreement on those basic rules. Several attempts have been and are being made to this purpose. 111 Should such an agreement be reached, a set of substantially constitutional rules, binding each State in force of an international treaty, would be laid down. Therefore, an analysis of the contents of an Internet Bill -however formulated and enacted -de- 111. The recent Internet Governance Forum has moved in this direction, but without reaching any results at the moment, Connecting Continents for Enhanced Multistakeholder Internet Governance, Istanbul-Turk., 2-5 September 2014, at http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf-2014. Concerning the Italian experience, a recent and most significant development is found in the Draft Declaration of Internet Rights (http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/upload_file/upload_files/ 000/000/189/dichiarazione_dei_diritti_internet_inglese.pdf) elaborated by a special Committee, appointed by the president of the Chamber of Deputies (on. L. Boldrini) (http://www.camera.it/leg17/1177). The Committee's work is still in progress, and is intended to provide the Italian Government with a technical and political basis for the promotion of promote an International Bill of rights. The overall results achieved so far can be considered satisfactory, although some provisions may appear to be insufficient and inadequate (see the comments of prof. De Minico, member of the Committee, in meeting n. 3, Oct. 8 th , 2014, at http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/attivita_commissione_inte rnet/files/000/000/003/resoconto_commissione_8ottobre.pdf (pp. 27-30). While this was being revised for print, the final draft of the Declaration of Interent Rights has been approved on July 28, 2015: http://www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/commissione_internet/testo_ definitivo_inglese.pdf. This latest version takes into account the suggestions and proposals, mine included, arising from the debate within the Committee. The results of a wide public consultation have also been considered. Conclusively, the document can be deemed to be a well-balanced compromise among different positions, as a constitutional inspiration should always bear.
serves to be pursued and is becoming more than a purely speculative exercise.
For the reasons discussed before, such a Bill should tackle two issues. Firstly, it should state that the conflict between opposite values must be resolved according to the prevalence of individual rights over economic liberties. Secondly, it should resolve the relationship between the binding sources and self-regulation with the prevalence of the former over the latter. Reference could be made here to the European Convention of Human Rights and European Charter of Fundamental Rights to point out at least three other more specific guarantees aimed at constraining the rulemaking power of policymakers: necessity, indispensability, and proportionality, extensively recalled by the two European Courts (Eur. Ct. H.R. and ECJ). 112 The language used by both is not always coincident, but it does not seem necessary to delve into the matter here.
113 I simply want to underline the fact that the discretionary power of the legislator is anything but undefined both in the European and in the International case law.
114
The first limit, i.e. necessity, is a one-way approach, requiring the sacrifice of a right to be accepted only if it cannot be avoided. The extent of the margin allowed by the court varies according to the policy area in question; for example, it is usually wider in economic or national security issues, and narrow in the area of criminal justice. As to the ECJ, it has also allowed Member States some discretion on their decision-making, stating that EU law does not impose upon the Member States an uniform scale of values as regards the assessment of conduct which may be considered contrary to public policy same right remains unfettered is viable. 115 The second limit, indispensability, is an instance of common ground between the Italian Constitutional Court 116 and the European Court of Human Rights. 117 The former has defined this limit as the "minimum essential content" for rights, up to the point of inducing part of the doctrine to consider the necessity a "limit to the limit." 118 Conclusively, no such restriction is allowed as to substantially extinguish the right, no matter how essential the interest pursued by the legislator may be.
The third limit, proportionality, 119 is the real test for the reasonableness of any legal provision. Costs and benefits must be assessed in order to check that a proper balance has been found between the interests embodied in the protected rights and those on which the legislative restriction is founded. 120 The goal is to prevent limitations to rights, which do not grant any significant and corresponding advantage to the competing interests.
121
A regulation which does not comply with the aforesaid principles may be found in the Hadopi 2. The law fails on at least three different grounds. Firstly, it balances heterogeneous values: a fundamental right (to access) vs. an economic interest (copyright). Secondly, it charges the former (the fundamental right) with excessive and disproportionate bounds. Finally, the restrictions laid down do not prove to be necessary. A support for this conclusion may be inferred from a report showing that the law has been unsuccessful in educating consumers to a lawful use of the Internet.
On the contrary the English High Court does not seem to share such a viewpoint: in fact, it has not hesitated to block alleged terrorist access to the Internet in order to avoid the danger of dissemination of certain ideas. 122 In this judicial balancing between fundamental values, a right is denied tout court on the occurrence not of immediate and current damage, but rather of the risk of its future occurrence.
123 Therefore, the High Court is disregarding two impassable limits safeguarding fundamental rights, putting the legitimacy of its ruling under European legal standards at serious risk.
Finally, I find a substantial support to my claims in the action of the ECtHR, 124 as quoted above. Limitations on fundamental rights and liberties may be allowed only if indispensable, not differently avoidable, and a correct and proportionate balance is found between the competing interests. This clear conclusion should contribute to the core of an Internet Bill such as it is proposed in this paper. More detailed rules could be left to self-regulation, in coherence with the opinion -set forth in this paper -that maintaining the legally binding rules to a minimum is the best choice for the Internet.
VI. EQUALITY ON THE INTERNET: MYTH OR REALITY?
I have underlined the need for a "Bill of Rights" tailored to the Internet, entrusted to a supranational legislator. I wish to point out now that two preliminary requirements should be met.
Firstly, the legislator should resort in its own rulemaking to self-defining concepts rather than to general clauses, and to substantive regulation instead of uncertain and general principles inevitably in need of broad interpretations. Secondly, the legislator should re- turn each actor, be it public or private, to its own domain, returning political choice to the policy-makers, wresting it back both from Independent Authorities and private powers, to which it has been entrusted through a broad delegation by policy-makers. This approach would allow Authorities to be entrusted with tasks more appropriate to their institutional position, involving no political responsibility. At the same time, the judicial power would be called to apply rules sufficiently defined in their content, enforcing the political project sketched out by the legislator, rather than starting one ex novo. A final question arises: is there a set of values, which the legislator will have to accept and enforce in drawing up a discipline well suited to the Internet? In my opinion, such a set of values does exist even now: it is made up of the principles of modern constitutionalism commonly shared in the European and Anglo-American experience, although it is clear that these principles must be rethought on the basis of the peculiarities of the Internet. 125 The first and paramount value to be taken into account is equality, which should thus be the keystone of a regulatory framework for the Internet. The virtual world is -no less than the real one -marked by strong inequalities, to be compensated with asymmetric regulation in bonam partem. 126 This concept leads to rules intended to promote weaker social categories in need of an additional protection in order that a greater equality may be effectively pursued. This is the foremost challenge of the Internet. The infinite possibilities of a better quality of life, better services, greater knowledge generated by the network must represent a chance for social redemption for those who so far have not been allowed to share economic prosperity and social inclusion. This is even more important because -in a world marked by increasing inequalities, which are a serious threat to the future of us all -the network proposes itself as the only tool potentially able to reverse the trend, even offering a new model of peaceful coexistence. In this sense, Internet can become the cornerstone of modern democracies, no less than the freedom of speech and of the press has already been in the past.
The goal of equality means that the Internet must be redeemed from the narrow image of a 'land' populated only by selfish myths of liberalism. Internet must be defended as the largest public space that humanity has ever had to gain experience of civic virtues and policies.
The issue of equality can be summarized in the right for citizens to access the Internet, for operators to next generation networks and, ultimately, for consumers to services. 127 The right of citizens' access consists in the universal provision of fast connection, regardless of location or income of the net-citizens. The right of operators aims to assure that network architecture is easily accessible to the non-owner operators. The right of the consumers to services meets the need to provide consumers with a broad choice between plural products offered by different economically independent entrepreneurs, in opposition to the substantial oligopoly of the giants of the network.
The goal of equality can only be pursued fighting powerful enemies. Its achievement is not a natural and predictable outcome of technical progress, which is not inherently oriented in a unique and predetermined direction. I am disputing the argument that the so called Lex Informatica 128 could be a primary and automatic source of a rule-making oriented per se and by default to the common good. Such a result may be obtained only if the policymaker has pursued equality as a specific goal, and has consequently provided effective means to achieve it. The preliminary choice of the goal that the technique should achieve belongs to the author of the rule, together with the accountability for the choice itself.
The best choice is found focusing on the recipient of the benefit provided by the technique. Should it be the weaker subject, or the already stronger one? In the first case, the technique will be the driving force for socially well-distributed growth; in the second case, the same will be the multiplier of well-being in favour of those who are already advantaged per se. munication enterprises have been detached from the common good following an incorrect concept of the market economy that reduces public intervention to ultra-minimal standards. We are currently facing a poor imitation of the Smithian chimera of an automatic harmony between public and individual interests: a myth to which not even Smith -in my opinion -seemed to believe fully.
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New concepts are required if the Internet is to be regulated in coherence with the values of equality and individual rights. These values are the only ones able to ensure that technological progress ends up in a chance of growth for all, aligning the weak categories with the wellfunded ones, something that up to now has been real only in the world of dreams. 
